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A B S T R A C T
Assigning land title to collective landholders is one of the primary policies land management agencies
use to avoid deforestation worldwide. Such programs are designed to improve the ability of landholders
to legally exclude competing users and thereby strengthen incentives to manage forests for long-term
beneﬁts. Despite the prevalence of this hypothesis, ﬁndings about the impacts of land titling programs on
deforestation are mixed. Evidence is often unreliable because programs are targeted according to factors
that independently inﬂuence the conversion of forests. We evaluate a donor-funded land titling and land
management program for indigenous communities implemented in Morona-Santiago, Ecuador. This
program offers a close to best case scenario for a land titling program to reduce deforestation because of
colonization pressure, availability of payments when titled communities maintain forests, and limited
opportunities for commercial agriculture. We match plots in program areas with similar plots outside
program areas on covariates that inﬂuence the conversion of forests. Based on matched comparisons, we
do not ﬁnd evidence that land titling or community management plans reduced forest loss in the ﬁve
years following legal recognition. The results call into question land titling as a direct deforestation
strategy and suggests land titling is better viewed a precursor to other programs.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Assigning land title to customary and collective landholders is
one of the primary policies used to avoid deforestation worldwide
(Davis and Wali, 1994; Soule et al., 2000; Fearnside, 2001; Otsuka
et al., 2001; Finley-Brook, 2007; ITTO, 2010; Larson, 2011; Larson
and Dahal, 2012; Robinson et al., 2014). Upon receiving title, forest
owners gain access to courts, law enforcement, and regulatory
agencies that improve their ability to exclude competing users like
colonists and extractive industries. Facing decreased risks that land
will be expropriated and less of a need to signal tenure status by
clearing forests, landholders may manage forest resources to
secure a continuous stream of timber, game, forest products, or
cultural amenities.
Based on these expectations, international aid donors, govern-
ment agencies, and conservation organizations have embraced* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 8058934075; fax: +1 8058935587.
E-mail addresses: buntaine@bren.ucsb.edu (M.T. Buntaine),
sehamilton@salisbury.edu (S.E. Hamilton), mmmillones@wm.edu (M. Millones).
1 Tel.: +1 4105483518.
2 Tel.: +1 7572212304.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.04.001
0959-3780/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articl
4.0/).land titling as a way to reduce deforestation, especially where
indigenous communities are landholders (Tucker, 1999). Accord-
ing to a search of a comprehensive database of international aid,
development organizations have spent more than $7.8 billion on
land titling programs since 1970 (Tierney et al., 2011). Some
development organizations, like the United States Agency for
International Development, maintain specialized ofﬁces to pro-
mote and manage land tenure programs worldwide (USAID/ARD,
2006). In 2012, USAID launched the $700 million, ﬁve-year
Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights program to expand
and strengthen property rights to land worldwide (USAID, 2013).
The World Resources Institute, a non-governmental organization
with global reach, created the Governance of Forests Initiative to
advise countries with extensive forests about land tenure. The
clariﬁcation of land tenure—use and occupation rights to land that
can be effectively enforced—through land titling in areas where
indigenous populations reside also aligns with donor efforts to
promote minority rights, credit markets, and pluralism in politics
(Liverman and Vilas, 2006; Godoy et al., 1998; Robinson et al., 2014).
In addition, land title can provide access to incentive programs
that pay for ecosystem services and the maintenance of forest
cover. For example, in support of the United Nations REDD+e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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titling programs (Naughton-Treves and Day, 2012). At the national
level, incentives schemes that pay for the maintenance of forests
require clearly delineated ownership. For example, Ecuador’s
ﬂagship Socio Bosque program that pays landholders to maintain
forests requires land title for eligibility (de Koning et al., 2011).
Despite the enthusiasm of forest managers and conservation
practitioners about land titling as a way to prevent deforestation,
little reliable evidence exists about how land titling affects forest
cover. Existing research has generated mixed ﬁndings (Ferretti-
Gallon and Busch, 2014) and often fails to isolate the direct effects
of land titling programs from the background factors that drive
targeting (Robinson et al., 2014). Because land titling programs are
targeted or clustered based on factors that independently affect
forest cover, such as remoteness or indigenous territory status, it is
difﬁcult to determine whether differences between program and
non-program areas are a result of land titling interventions. This
challenge is common for spatially explicit land management
policies (Joppa and Pfaff, 2010). Additionally, as is the case with
many areas of policy (Asian Development Bank, 2010; Pluye et al.,
2004; Scheirer, 2005; Stirman et al., 2012), there is considerable
uncertainty about medium to long-term effects of land titling
programs because monitoring is not frequently pursued after
programs are concluded.
Adding to the uncertainty, the effects of land titling programs
are likely to be conditional on the governance environment and
interactions with other programs (Barsimantov and Antezana,
2012; Mullan et al., 2011; Barsimantov et al., 2011; Paneque-
Ga´lvez et al., 2013). Land titles may not change land management
patterns without supporting institutions that enforce exclusion
rules and legitimize claims to them (Kerekes and Williamson,
2010). Thus, land titling programs must be evaluated across
different combinations of supporting institutions, such as land
management programs, incentive policies for owners, and
community decision-making procedures in the case of communal
landholdings.
To produce reliable ﬁndings, we analyze a unique, parcel-level
dataset of a USAID-funded land titling program for communal and
indigenous areas in the heavily forested province of Morona-
Santiago, Ecuador. We directly address the non-random spatial
targeting of the program. We also evaluate variations in the effect
of the program on forest cover when it is implemented with a
complementary program of community management planning.
The Programa de Sostenibilidad y Unio´n Regional Sur (PSUR)
was a $27 million, binational border integration and development
program that was co-implemented by CARE (Cooperative for
Assistance and Relief Everywhere) and other local and interna-
tional organizations in three provinces between 2002 and 2007
(CARE, 2007). The program intended to support the post-conﬂict
Peruvian-Ecuadorian Broad Agreement of Border Integration,
Development and Good Neighborhood (Acuerdo Amplio Peruano-
Ecuatoriano de Integracio´n Fronteriza, Desarrollo y Vecindad) and
aimed to increase the wellbeing of populations along the border
(Donoso, 2009; Hocquenghem and Durt, 2002). CARE implemen-
ted an analogous program call Frontera Norte in the Peruvian
border provinces, although it focused more on basic infrastructure
(USAID, 2005). PSUR was also part of USAID’s Conservation and
Development Strategies with Lowland Indigenous Groups initia-
tive, which aimed to support conservation of the nearby and
overlapping Kutuku´ Protected Forest area, as well as to strengthen
indigenous land rights (USAID, 2010, 2011; CARE, 2012). In
Morona-Santiago province, PSUR claimed to beneﬁt more than
24,000 people and to title more than 170,000 hectares of
communal, indigenous lands, approximately 80% of which
received complementary support for a community land manage-
ment.We identify matched counterfactual plots that are similar to the
plots that received community titles and management plans, but
that remain untitled through the end of our study period. This
matching procedure allows us to isolate the impact of PSUR from
the background factors that determined its targeting, a pressing
need for research about land tenure programs (Robinson et al.,
2014). After matching treatment plots to comparable control plots,
we ﬁnd that community land titles, whether or not coupled with
community management plans, had no distinguishable impact on
average on forest cover in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after the recognition of
legal tenure status. Our results raise important questions about the
role of land titling and community management programs in
directly reducing deforestation.
2. Theory of causation
Land titling programs attempt to increase the security of land
tenure by improving exclusion—the ability of landholders to
prevent potentially competing users from extracting value from
land at present or in the future. Land titling increases the security
of land tenure on average over time by facilitating access to the
enforcement capabilities of the state and providing a ‘‘reference
point’’ that can be used by traditional institutions to adjudicate
land disputes (Fort, 2008; Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Bennett and
Sierra, 2014). Past research ﬁnds that titles have been useful for
improving exclusion of competing land claimants in Madagascar
(Jacoby and Minten, 2007), for increasing land values in frontier
areas in Brazil because of more secure alienation rights (Alston
et al., 1996), and for decreasing the costs of enforcing boundaries
(Mendelsohn, 1994). Exclusion is costly, which pushes community
or individual landholders with insecure tenure to extract value
from the land quickly or to engage in land uses that entrench their
tenure. Land titling aims to strengthen land tenure and is thought
to mitigate these incentives.
Improved exclusion through land titling can both increase and
decrease the rate of forest conversion depending on the context. In
a recent meta-analysis of 117 studies about deforestation, Ferretti-
Gallon and Busch (2014) found that secure property rights to land
do not have consistent effects on deforestation. Secure land rights
only seem to reduce deforestation in studies where they are the
primary variable of interest, rather than a control variable in a
multivariate regression, potentially indicating publication bias in
the scientiﬁc literature. In a different review, Robinson et al. (2014)
ﬁnd that most empirical studies about land tenure and forest cover
do not have clear strategies to separate the direct effects of land
titling programs from the background factors that drive their
targeting. Improving the state of knowledge depends both on
identifying the contextual factors that moderate the relationship
between land titles and forest conversion and on employing
methods that distinguish the direct effects of land titling programs
from the background factors that drive their targeting.
Conceptually, it is useful to identify the ways that land titling
inﬂuences the use of forests by competing users and landholders
themselves. In many areas where indigenous communities reside,
the poaching of forest resources by outsiders and encroachment
into traditional territories are signiﬁcant drivers of deforestation
(Hayes, 2010). Indigenous lands are often expropriated by groups
who wish to extract mineral resources or convert forests to
agricultural or urban uses (White and Martin, 2002; Bebbington,
2013). Without formal title, communities are not able to avail
themselves easily of legal remedies when colonists or extractive
industries move onto their traditional lands (Brasselle et al., 2002;
Hayes, 2010). Land tenure programs that provide legal property
rights for indigenous communities have been found to reduce
deforestation based on the improved exclusion of settlers (Nelson
et al., 2001). To the extent that land titles improve the ability of
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titling should be associated with the maintenance of forest cover.
Land titling may also affect land use decisions by communal
landholders themselves, in particular by lengthening the time
period they expect to obtain value from the land. Increasing the
time horizon of landholders increases the expected value of
beneﬁts that accrue over multi-decadal periods, including timber,
game, and cultural amenities. When landholders gain more secure
tenure over long periods through titling, they are more likely to
forego uses of forests that offer short-term beneﬁts at the expense
of these long-term beneﬁts, such as low-productivity agriculture
(see Araujo et al., 2009). When land contains a valuable natural
resource that can be extracted, such as timber, having security
from outside users through title can lengthen the time horizon for
extraction and even promote investment in afforestation and
sustainable forest management by forest owners (Nguyen et al.,
2010).
More directly, the conversion of forests to agricultural and
pastoral land uses is often a strategy to signal tenure to competing
users and to relevant authorities when legal status is not
established. Forest clearing has been used to successfully establish
rights to land in different settings (Hayes, 2010; Fortmann, 1990).
In the Brazilian Amazon, for example, settlers who cleared land
have later gained recognition of land claims from the state. In
response, indigenous people clear forests to signal their willing-
ness to defend land claims against settlers when their tenure is not
legally recognized (Araujo et al., 2009). Once land titles are in place,
neither current nor competing landholders have incentives to
convert forests as a way to achieve land tenure.
Options to raise revenue by maintaining forests also become
available to landholders with title, which should reduce defores-
tation. Many incentives schemes pay owners for the values that
forests provide to non-landholders, like water quality, air quality,
biodiversity, and ﬂood control (e.g., Arriagada et al., 2012). Access
to incentives schemes for maintaining forests is often conditional
on having title to land. These schemes depend on identifying the
individual or group that is legally responsible for managing a
certain forested area. As the international community moves to
expand programs that provide payments for the ecosystem
services that forests provide, such as the global REDD+ program
that seeks to mitigate climate change, land titling programs often
come ﬁrst (Sunderlin et al., 2009; Duchelle et al., 2014). Land title
can thus be a critical means of connecting landholders with
incentive schemes that promote the maintenance of forests (e.g.,
de Koning et al., 2011).
While there are a number of ways that land titling can work to
maintain forests by improving the security of tenure, it can also
increase deforestation in certain contexts. When agricultural,
pastoral, or urban land uses require signiﬁcant upfront invest-
ment but offer long-term beneﬁts, land titling may increase
deforestation. With the secure tenure afforded by land titles,
owners have increased certainty about being able to capture long-
term beneﬁts of new productive uses. Additionally, land titles can
often be used as the collateral for credit, making investment in
active land uses more likely for formerly subsistence farmers
(Deininger and Chamorro, 2004; Otsuki et al., 2002; Marchand,
2012).
Of course, the returns to investment in alternative land uses are
contextual. In a review of the drivers of land use by indigenous
groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Gray et al. (2008) ﬁnd that
integration with commercial markets is the key predictor of
conversion of forests to agriculture by indigenous groups. Since
commercial opportunities for agricultural or pastoral uses are
likely to be lowest in more remote areas (e.g., Alston et al., 1996),
deforestation is a less likely outcome in these areas in response to
land titling.It is important to note that many factors apart from land titles
and their resulting tenure security affect the incentives of
landholders regarding resource extraction and the conversion of
forests. Land titles for groups do not necessarily solve collective
action or community management challenges that have been
highlighted in the expansive literature on the commons (e.g.,
Agrawal, 2001; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Gibson, 2005). For
example, Tucker (1999) argues that a community land title only
improves a community’s ability to exclude external users and does
not necessarily deal with more challenging questions about
community management of common resources. Other research
ﬁnds that traditional, indigenous institutions are less effective at
managing the use of forests by indigenous users as compared to
outsiders (Bremner and Lu, 2006). In contrast, Hayes and Murtinho
(2008) show that indigenous groups with stronger community
property management institutions are more likely to prevent
agriculture expansion. Taken together, this body of research
suggests that land titling programs will only be effective at
reducing deforestation by landholders when supported by strong,
collective decision-making processes.
Additionally, land titling programs are not always insulated
from political inﬂuence and can themselves result in the
expropriation of customary lands. Wealthy and powerful individ-
uals can use their inﬂuence to capture disputed lands (Broegaard,
2009). Because land titling programs can set off competition for
title among competing users, it is possible that land titling
programs focus appropriation effort on nearby lands that remain
untitled, resulting in more deforestation or ‘‘leakage’’ in those
nearby lands (Jacoby and Minten, 2007). Thus, analyses about the
effects of land titling on forest cover must be careful to consider
impacts on equity and nearby areas (Wainwright and Bryan, 2009).
While past research about the effects of land titling on forest
conversion has been based on the theoretical expectations we
outline, little reliable evidence exists that accounts for the
targeting of programs. Little research exists that examines how
land titling affects forest cover over time. Land title might have
both positive and negative effects on forest cover, but the net
effects are thought to be substantially positive in relatively remote
areas occupied by indigenous landholders (Fearnside, 2001;
Holland et al., 2014). We tackle the theoretical and empirical
challenges that have limited existing research by examining a
unique land titling program that offers close to a best case for land
titling to reduce deforestation.
3. Study context: PSUR as a close to best-case land titling
program
Almost all of the contextual factors that help land titling
programs reduce deforestation are present over much of the area
covered by PSUR (Table 1). Thus, the ﬁndings of this research can
be interpreted in light of a best case study design. If the program is
found to reduce deforestation, the next step would be to
disentangle the most important factors or combinations of factors
that contribute to this effect. If the program does not reduce
deforestation, the promise of land titling as a direct intervention to
reduce deforestation comes into question more generally, given
the preponderance of supporting factors.
Morona-Santiago is approximately 24,346 km2 and had an
estimated 2001 population of 120,487 rising to 214,786 by 2010.
At between 8 and 9 people per km2, the population density is one of
the lowest in Ecuador, far below the national average of 58.2
people per km2. The province is dominated by tropical rainforest in
the eastern and southern portion and Andean mountain areas in
the far west. Shuar indigenous groups dominate the lowland
regions with between 60,000 and 85,000 members as of 2010. The
Achuar nation located in the southeastern portion of the region has
Table 1
Factors that moderate the effect of land titling on forest cover.
Land titling will reduce deforestation when these conditions are present Land titling will increase deforestation when these conditions are present
* Colonization and extraction pressure from competing users;
* Land clearing is used as a strategy to assert rights under insecure tenure;
* Forests have high economic and cultural value for landholders;
* Complementary land management programs and training;
* Access to payments for ecosystem services programs.
* Opportunities for commercial agriculture based on proximity to markets;
* Traditional landholders are able and likely to sell land to new user groups;
* Opportunity to receive title sets off competition for land by competing users;
* Increased extractive capacity because of reduced effort devoted to exclusion.
Notes: Conditions that are present in the study area are italicized.
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comprised of non-indigenous colonists that typically practice
agriculture and raise livestock (see SI, Appendix A for more
background information). The region is known for its high
ecological value and the entire study area is recognized as one
of the top 25 biodiversity hotspots globally (Myers et al., 2000).
PSUR offered Shuar Indigenous organizations the opportunity
to codify the exclusivity of traditional lands and prevent further
encroachment by mestizo and quichua colonizers. Since the 1950s,
colonization was common in the study region due to publicly
supported road building and formal colonization policies that tied
land rights to converting land into agricultural and pastoral uses.
Although land claims where pursued by the Shuar from the 1970s,
it was not until decades later that some of these claims were acted
upon, especially in the north of the province, along the access road
(Rudel et al., 2002). In many other cases however, unclear
legislation and hostile authorities prevented the formalization of
claims, even when the local population thought that their tenure
was secured by title. PSUR offered the Shuar Indigenous organiza-
tions a chance to ﬁnally achieve secure land tenure and access to
enforcement by state agencies (CARE, 2007).
As part of PSUR, Shuar communities gained collective title after
undergoing a legalization process that produced Land Legalization
Plans (Plan de Manejo para Legalizacio´n or PMLs) with the
assistance of CARE-Ecuador and local partner PRODEPINE (The
Project for the Development of the Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadorian People of Ecuador). These plans detailed the location
and boundaries of claimed land, claimant status, and zoning
designations for forest protection, agriculture, and pasture. All of
the 52 communities that received title in our study area completed
PMLs. It is possible that some of these lands were included in an
earlier formalization efforts conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, but
it appears that these titles were either never fully recognized by
the state or limited in scope. Hence, a new titling program was
required by government agencies in the early 2000s.
All communities that took part in the PSUR program from
2003 onwards completed supplementary management plans (Plan
de Manejo Integral or PMIs) that contained a general diagnosis of
the socio-economic and environmental status of the community
and a plan for managing human, natural, and physical resources.
For a PMI to be approved by the Ministry of Environment, it had to
have been discussed and accepted by the communal assembly.
PMIs were initially designed and co-implemented by non-proﬁt
partners of USAID, but eventually trained local personnel from the
Shuar Federation produced them. Because only 41 of the
52 communities that received title through the PSUR program
produced these plans, we are able to compare the efﬁcacy of land
titling with and without supporting land management planning
activities (Fig. 1).
In terms of securing access to the long-term value of forests, the
land titling made available through PSUR provided Shuar
communities the opportunity to reafﬁrm their identity and the
validity of their way of life. Land use zoning within PMIs contained
provisions to establish areas of no agricultural use to facilitate the
maintenance of areas for hunting, plant gathering and recreation.According to the CARE (2007) evaluation of PSUR, 66 percent of
Shuar communities reported improvements in maintaining their
traditional ways of life as a result of land titling, which includes the
household division of labor, the use of natural resources, and the
preservation of spirituality. Recent studies echo this evaluation
and suggest that in spite of decades of progressive acculturation,
the Shuar in the Trans-Kutuku area have generally maintained
their traditional land use systems (CARE, 2007; Lo´pez et al., 2013).
The traditional zoning, corresponding to land use ‘rings’ around a
village center dedicated to agriculture, ranching, gathering,
hunting and ﬁshing, was formalized in PMIs along with technical
requirements to meet government standards. Furthermore use
standards (acuerdos mı´nimos de uso) were established as part of
PMIs to ensure that Shuar families would manage their land
according to the Ministry of Environment’s guidelines.
PSUR also offered later access to payments for the maintenance
of forests in many of the communities in our sample. Ecuador’s
ﬂagship state program that provides payments for forest conser-
vation, Socio Bosque, began in 2008. Communities or individuals
voluntarily enroll by pledging to maintain ‘‘native’’ vegetation
intact for 20 years. In exchange of each hectare of conserved land,
landowners receive payment that must be invested in local
development projects. Land title is a prerequisite for accessing
Socio Bosque (Krause and Nielsen, 2014). Even though Socio Bosque
did not begin activity in the study area until late 2008, the program
had been in negotiations with local organizations like FICSH for a
several years. Shuar communities in the southern section of the
PSUR intervention area were among the ﬁrst to enroll. By 2011,
slightly less than half of communities legalized by PSUR had land
enrolled in Socio Bosque. By 2012, about 100,000 hectares of Shuar
territory were registered in Socio Bosque according to the
program’s own statistics (Socio Bosque, 2012).
In summary, the contextual factors that should support the
reduction of deforestation following land titling are present in the
program area, while almost all of the conditions that would cause
land titling to increase deforestation are absent. The PSUR program
offers a close to best case scenario for a land titling program to
reduce deforestation.
4. Data and methods
We obtained spatial data on the intervention areas of all waves
of PSUR from USAID Ecuador and their partners Ecolex, the Bosques
y Costas Project, and CARE International. These partners provided a
portion of the data on titles in digital format. We digitized and
georeferenced other title boundaries from PSUR documentation
and paper maps. We approximated three community boundaries
based on hard copy and digital documentation we obtained during
ﬁeld visits with partners in May 2013, including management
plans completed as part of the PSUR program. For nine communi-
ties where no data was available, we used existing settlement
names to estimate the corresponding community lands (Fig. 1).
To assess whether land titles and management plans achieved
conservation goals we divided Morona-Santiago province into
27,984 0.87 km2 grid cells. A grid approach is preferable to a
Fig. 1. The study area and locations of titling and management planning treatments. Notes: The blue areas of the map represent communities that underwent legalization
planning (PML) as part of PSUR. The red areas of the map represent communities that underwent both legalization and management planning (PMI) as part of PSUR. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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can capture factors that make deforestation more or less likely
within a community object, such as slope or pre-existing land
cover. Additionally, compiling data at the level of the pixel allows
for aggregation into objects like communities, but compiling data
at the level of objects does not allow disaggregation to pixels. We
chose pixel size based on a combination of our coarsest input
dataset (population density by Landscan) and the desire to have
multiple Global Forest Change (GFC) pixels that we use as the
primary outcome variable feed into each grid cell (Hansen et al.,
2013).
We examined the amount of forest loss in each grid cell in the
ﬁve years following legalization and management planning. For
our main analysis, we use the GFC measure of forest loss to
generate post-treatment forest loss in each of our grid cells. The
GFC data provides a measure of the conversion of forest cover to
non-forest cover each year, with forest deﬁned as vegetation
reaching at least 5 m height (SI, Appendix C contains a discussion of
the strengths and weaknesses of these data). In supplementary
analyses, we verify our ﬁndings using enhanced vegetation index(EVI) derived from MODIS, which can be more sensitive to forest
degradation (SI, Appendix B).
The GFC data show that Morona-Santiago was 89% forested
with 21,713 km2 of forest cover immediately before our study
period in 2000. By the end of our study period in 2012, 315 km2 or
1.45% of the baseline forest had been converted to non-forest.
Although deforestation is relatively low across the province, two
distinct areas experienced signiﬁcant deforestation, both of which
partially overlap the PSUR intervention area. The ﬁrst is the
western portion of the province along the only major road (E40) in
the region. Along this corridor, approximately 3.2% of the forests
were converted during the study period. The second is at the
intersection of the Rio Morona and E45 near the Peruvian border.
Approximately 3.8% of forests in this corridor, which is within
Shuar indigenous territory, were converted during the study
period. Fig. 2 depicts the two corridors of deforestation (panel A)
and the common pattern of agricultural clearing alone E40 in the
Rio Morona corridor (panel B). The PSUR inventions are mostly
located between these two corridors, which may indicate either
the successful reduction of deforestation or the strategic targeting
Fig. 2. Study area and patterns of deforestation. Panel A depicts the two zones of deforestation in the intervention areas. Panel B depicts the ﬁshbone deforestation pattern
observed when settlers covert forests along transportation corridors, which is common in the Amazon region.
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deforestation.
Disentangling the direct effects of land management interven-
tions from the background factors that drive their targeting is a
major challenge (Ferraro, 2009; Joppa and Pfaff, 2010). Both
observable and unobservable differences between treatment areas
that receive an intervention and control areas that do not receive
an intervention can confound estimates of the effects of an
intervention. We employ a matching approach to construct a set of
control plots that have similar pre-treatment characteristics to the
plots in the PSUR program. We compile spatial data on other
variables that have strong associations with forest loss in the
extant literature (Table 2). We then iteratively search through sets
of control observations outside of the PSUR intervention area to
select a set of control units that have observed distributions of each
covariate that are not observationally different from the distribu-
tions of the same covariates in the treatment plots as described in
Equation 1, where r is the observed values in the selected set of
treatment and control groups, X is a matrix of covariate values, and
T is the treatment state (see Appendix C for the full statisticalTable 2
Control variables used to balance treatment and control plots and for regression adjus
Source 
Forest loss Hansen et al. (2013) 
Forest loss within 5 km2 (t  1) Hansen et al. (2013) 
Forest cover percent (t  1) Hansen et al. (2013) 
Distance to major roads OSM, VMAP1, MAE 
Distance to electric grid VMAP1, MAE 
Distance to river VMAP1, MAE 
Distance to disturbed land classiﬁcation MOD12Q1 
Indigenous Shuar land TNC 
Protected area status WDPA, MAE, TNC 
Population density within 5 km2 (t  1) Landscan 
Elevation/slope Souris (2008), IRB derivation).
rðXijTi ¼ 1Þ  rðXijTi ¼ 0Þ (1)
Our ﬁrst set of covariates are measures of forest loss in pre-
treatment time periods: the amount of forest cover in the subject
plot and the pre-treatment rate of forest loss within 5 km2 of the
plot. These variables attempt to capture background rates of
deforestation that cannot be explained by the other observable
covariates, which alleviates some concerns about unobserved
differences between the treatment and control plots. Indeed,
matching studies are frequently able to reproduce the results of
more reliable experimental studies when a pre-treatment measure
of the outcome is used for matching (Cook et al., 2008).
Our second set of covariates—distances to roads, rivers,
electricity grids, and disturbed lands—all account for the increased
value of production and ease of colonization on lands that are more
connected with built infrastructure. Within the Amazon region, a
large majority of studies cite roads as a driver of deforestation
(Arima et al., 2005; Rudel et al., 2009). Thus, it is necessary totment.
Temporal granularity Native resolution
Annual 30 m
Annual 30 m
Annual 30 m
Various, 1993, 2012 Vector
1993, 2012 Vector
2012 Vector
Annual .5 km
2012 Vector
Annual Vector
Annual 1 km
2001 30 m
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infrastructure and connection to settlements. The western portion
of our study region lacks access to roads and utility infrastructure,
and the dominate form of transport occurs by river, so we also
match on this covariate. In addition, the distance to land that has
already been converted from forest is one of the most important
predictors of forest conversion, through population diffusion and
frontier effects (Walker et al., 2002; Geist et al., 2006; Rudel et al.,
2009). The majority of disturbed lands in our study area are
farmlands, with limited urban settlements, both of which are
important covariates for creating a balanced control set.
Our third set of covariates for matching—the indigenous status
of landholders, protected area status, and population density—are
demographic and institutional variables that may impact rates of
forest conversion. The PSUR program in Morona-Santiago was
explicitly targeted to secure land title for Shuar communities. Past
research shows that ethnic backgrounds can predict land use
because of cultural practices, particular skills, or institutions that
govern collective action (Bray et al., 2006; Stocks et al., 2007). Thus,
we match plots based on whether they are occupied by Shuar
indigenous communities. Likewise, land use inside protected areas
is managed under different rules than non-protected areas, often
with legal penalties for the conversion of forests. For Shuar
communities in our study area that reside in ‘‘soft’’ protected areas,
rates of deforestation might be lower owing to additional
restrictions on the use of forests, which is a common pattern in
many areas (Andam et al., 2008; Nelson and Chomitz, 2011; Joppa
and Pfaff, 2011). Additionally, because population density is
associated with the intensity of forest use (Laurance et al., 2002),
we seek to ﬁnd a set of control plots with the same localized
population density as PSUR treatment plots.
Finally, we match on two geophysical covariates that affect the
suitability of forest areas for other land uses—elevation and slope.
Both the desirability of timber species and land’s suitability for
agriculture depend on elevation. Additionally, areas of high slope
are difﬁcult to access, deforest and use for productive agriculture as
compared to relatively ﬂat areas (Yackulic et al., 2011). Table 2
contains a more complete description of characteristics of the full
set of covariates used in our matching procedure.
Before executing the matching procedure, we discard control
observations that fall outside the range of values observed for
treatment units for each of the covariates. We carry out statistical
matching using a genetic algorithm that both weights and discards
control plots that do not serve as comparable units to the
treatment plots (Sekhon, 2007; Diamond and Sekhon, 2013). We
apply a genetic algorithm that iteratively searches through many
sets of potential control plots to maximize balance on the observed
covariates. Matched sets with good balance, those that have a large
minimum p-value on paired t-test for differences of means between
treatment and control observations across all covariates are passed
onto the next generation, along with mutated sets to ensure the full
space of sets of control observations are explored.
Matching does not ensure that treatment and control observa-
tions are similar for unobserved variables. We rely on the
assumption that matching on pre-treatment measures of the
outcome reduces unobserved heterogeneity and often reproduces
causal estimates (Cook et al., 2008). A more complete description of
the matching procedure and a justiﬁcation of our assumption about
capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the pre-treatment value of
the outcome can be found in Supporting information, Appendix C.
We estimate difference-in-differences between treatment and
control plots using ordinary least squares regression with
aggregated forest loss over the ﬁve years following the PSUR
interventions (Eq. (2)).
aiðYiðt ¼ xÞ  Yiðt ¼ 0ÞÞ ¼ aiða þ tTi þ bXiÞ (2)where Yi is the amount of forest cover at different times, ai is the
square root of the weight for each observation, a is the regression
intercept, t is the treatment effect of the PSUR intervention, and b
is a vector of coefﬁcients for control variables. To check the
assumption that the treatment indicator is observationally
independent from covariates X, we compare estimates of
treatment effects dropping the bXi for all speciﬁcations. If the
PSUR interventions have the intended effect, we will observe
smaller losses in forest cover in the treatment plots than the
control plots, both aggregated over several years and on a year-to-
year basis.
The methods we employ have two distinct advantages over
cross-sectional regression approaches that are common in the
literature on forest policy (see also Blackman, 2013). Regression
approaches without matching adjust treatment and control
observations based on modeling assumptions about how the
chosen covariates affect the outcome. By selecting a set of control
observations that are already similar to treatment observations
without signiﬁcant statistical adjustment, matching renders
estimates less sensitive to model assumptions that cannot be
easily tested (Ho et al., 2007). The difference-in-difference method
has the added beneﬁt of generating more precise estimates by
removing time-invariant, cross-sectional variation in the outcome
measure and accounting for common trends in the outcome across
treatment and control observations (for another application, see
Arriagada et al., 2012).
5. Results
We ﬁrst examine the results of legalization plans and titles
without enhanced community management plans on forest loss
during the following ﬁve years. As part of the ﬁrst wave of land
titling in 2002, nine Shuar communities that worked with CARE
and the local non-governmental organization PRODEPINE received
titles after completing a legalization plan or PML. Although these
communities are Shuar, they did not follow the same selection
criteria as the later wave of PSUR. In particular, they were not
inside or adjacent to the Kutuku´ Protected Forest and did not
receive the same support to create natural resource management
plans and other livelihood activities (Fig. 3, panel C).
Difference-in-difference least-squares regression without pre-
matching (Fig. 4), model (a) provides an estimate of the treatment
effect of legalization planning and land titling on deforestation
over ﬁve years, after controlling for the other factors that drive
deforestation in the area. As shown in the corresponding bar (a),
the aggregate treatment effect of land titling and the legalization
plan over ﬁve years is estimated to be a reduction of more than
1000 m2of forest loss for each approximately 1 km2 study plot. The
challenge, however, is that the targeting of the titling program is
associated with a number of other factors that reduce deforesta-
tion. For example, PML-only treatment plots are on average further
away from major roads and more likely to have high slopes than
other regions of the study area, both of which tend to decrease
forest loss (Technical Appendix, Table A1 contains balance
statistics). In a simple regression, the estimated treatment effects
will be highly dependent on the model assumptions used for
statistical adjustment (e.g., linear effects of the covariates) and the
assumption that covariates affect the outcome independent from
the treatment (e.g., additive effects), which is not substantiated in
this case since targeting occurred purposefully.
After matching to ﬁnd a set of plots that did not receive a PSUR
intervention, remained untitled through 2012, and had similar
observed distributions of covariates, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
that having a legalization plan and communal title reduces forest
loss over the next ﬁve years. Fig. 4, models (b)/(c) show that this
result is consistent across post-matching models that include and
Fig. 3. Panel A. Land tenure on type of property based on Secretarı´a Nacional de Planiﬁcacio´n y Desarrollo (SENPLADES). Panel B. National Protected Area (hard conservation)
and Protected Forest (Bosques Protectores). Panel C. PML-only treatment and control areas generated by matching. Panel D. PMI treatment and control areas generated by
matching.
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balanced through the matching procedure. We do not present
coefﬁcient estimates for the control variables, since they
correspond to a non-representative set of observations created
to isolate the effect of the treatment variable. The point estimate
in both models is similar and indicates higher rates of
deforestation in areas following land titling, but this result is
not statistically distinguishable from variation that would occur
by random chance. The consistency of the point estimates in
models (b) and (c) is an indication that matching has made the
treatment variable observationally independent from the
covariates.We also considered the possibility that the effects of land titling
could be realized at different points in time after the intervention.
For example, titling might focus attention on land management
immediately after the legal process, resulting in decreased
deforestation only in early years. Alternatively, it may be several
years until new management plans take effect given the challenges
of reforming existing institutions and practices. Thus, we examine
the effects of land titling in each year following the PSUR
intervention. The results are similar to the aggregated estimates
(Fig. 5). The difference-in-differences point estimates of the
treatment effect without pre-matching indicate reduced defores-
tation, though this result is only statistically signiﬁcant in two of
Fig. 4. Difference in differences over ﬁve years for PSUR plots with legalization plan
(PML) and title versus non-PSUR plots with no plan or title, 2002–2012. Notes:
Figure shows treatment effect of tenure status for models as follows: (a) covariates,
no pre-matching; (b) no covariates, pre-matching; (c) covariates, pre-matching.
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treatment effect after pre-matching, both with and without
matched covariates used for regression adjustment, are never
statistically distinguishable from results that are likely to be
realized by random chance (blue lines). Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence
that land titling alone reduces deforestation within ﬁve years of the
intervention when comparing treatment areas to similar areas that
remain untitled.
As mentioned earlier, the second wave of PSUR from
2003 onwards included a variety of management and training
activities in addition to legalization. Activities included funding of
the Shuar Federation operations and training for its staff,
supplemental income generation programs related to handicrafts,
animal husbandry, and agriculture, as well as planning low-impact
forestry and agroforestry operations. Many of these activities were
articulated in an Integrated Management Plan (PMI), which aimed
to support the success of the land titling program by strengtheningFig. 5. PML-only effects on an annual basis following treatment. Notes: The black
line/gray error bars are regression without pre-matching; the blue lines and error
bars are regression estimates with pre-matching both with (dark blue) and without
(light blue) covariates. The error bars show two standard errors. (For interpretation
of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)local institutions of collective decision-making and complement-
ing titles with activities that promoted sustainable use of the land.
In light of the synergy between PMIs and land titles, we pre-
match and then estimate the impact of the second wave of PSUR,
which includes all programs implemented from 2003 onward,
compared to similar non-program areas that did not receive title
during the study period. Like the ﬁrst wave, all program areas have
a PML and land title. Like the results we report for PML-only plots,
the full PMI treatment appears to reduce forest conversion in the
difference-in-difference regression model without pre-matching
(Fig. 6, model a). However, like the regression model for the PML-
only treatment, the plots that received title and management plans
have background characteristics associated with lower levels of
forest loss, including lower population densities and greater
distance from disturbed land classiﬁcations (Technical Appendix,
Table A1 contains balance statistics). This raises the possibility that
the estimated effect is driven by collinearity with these covariates
and modeling assumptions, rather than an actual treatment effect.
Again, we conduct a search for a set of control plots using a
genetic matching algorithm that are similar on observable
covariates to the treatment plots. In the post-matching models
both with and without the covariates, we estimate that the
treatment effect of titling and management plans on forest loss is
approximately zero (Fig. 6, models b/c). Because the post-matching
models with and without covariates have similar estimates, we are
conﬁdent that in the post-matching dataset the treatment variable
is observationally independent from the covariates that have an
effect on forest loss, reducing or eliminating bias in estimates due
to collinearity and modeling assumptions.
Similar to the PML-only analysis, we disaggregate the effect of
the PMI treatment and estimate treatment effects for individual
years following the program (Fig. 7). The results of this analysis
mirror those reported for the PML-only analysis. The difference-in-
differences point estimates of treatment effects without pre-
matching indicate reduced deforestation, with a statistically
signiﬁcant result in four out of ﬁve years (black line). In contrast,
the point estimates of the treatment effect after pre-matching,
both with and without matched covariates included in the
difference-in-differences regression, are never statistically distin-
guishable from results that are likely to be realized by random
chance (blue lines). Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that land titling plusFig. 6. Difference in differences over ﬁve years for PSUR plots with title and USAID-
funded management plan versus non-PSUR plots with no title, 2002–2012. Notes:
Figure shows treatment effect of PMI treatment for models as follows: (a)
covariates, no pre-matching; (b) no covariates, pre-matching; (c) covariates, pre-
matching.
Fig. 7. Titling and PMI effects on an annual basis following treatment. Notes: The
black line/gray error bars are regression without pre-matching; the blue lines and
error bars are regression estimates with pre-matching both with (dark blue) and
without (light blue) covariates. The error bars show two standard errors. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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ﬁve years of the intervention when comparing treatment areas to
similar areas that remain untitled, either cumulatively over ﬁve
years or annually.
In addition to these main results, we report a number of
additional results and robustness checks in the Supporting
Information. First, we report the balance statistics for the
covariates used in the matching procedure for both the PML-only
and PMI models (SI, Table B1). Next, we report results of the same
empirical procedure reported above, but only for study plots that
are inside Shuar lands as reported by the Nature Conservancy
Ecuador (SI, Figs. B1–B4). Because some of the land titling occurred
in areas that are not exclusively Shuar according other datasets, we
restrict our analysis to areas where titling and other datasets agree
about indigenous status. We also examine these results using EVI
as the outcome variable (SI, Figs. B5 and B6). The main results do
not change. We also tested for the possibility that legalization and
management plans (PMIs) interact with protected status where
they overlap, given that past research highlights interactions
between land tenure types (Holland et al., 2014). We did not ﬁnd
an interaction in our sample and report only main effects in our
main text and appendix results. Finally, we add a technical
appendix that describes the derivations and sources of our
covariates in greater detail (SI, Appendix D).
6. Discussion and conclusion
We ﬁnd no evidence that land titling with or without
management planning reduces deforestation in the ﬁve years
following treatment for the PSUR program in Ecuador. This result is
robust across different subsets of the data and at different periods
of time following treatment. Our ﬁndings are some of the ﬁrst
evidence about the effects of land titling programs on forest cover
that compare program areas to similar non-program areas. Our
ﬁnding of a near zero effect has important implications for a
number of research areas and policy decisions about land tenure
programs being implemented around the world.
First, no previous research that we are aware of uses matching
techniques to address the factors that are likely to confound the
relationship between land titling and forest outcomes. This has leftmuch of the research on land titling and land tenure programs on
weak empirical footing (Robinson et al., 2014). The dangers of
relying on simple regressions to estimate the effects of land tenure
and community forest management on environmental outcomes
are highlighted by our results. For both PML-only and PMI
treatment plots, simple difference-in-difference regressions with
control variables generate estimates that indicate reduced forest
loss as a result of PSUR. These results are similar to other studies
that do not address selection and collinearity in regression (e.g.,
Barsimantov and Kendall, 2012). The PSUR intervention in our
study area is implemented in areas that already have lower
background rates of deforestation as compared to non-program
areas. Our results speak to the need in the empirical literature to
take on selection and targeting challenges more directly.
Second, the literature on common property and the collective
management of forests has been generally positive on the potential
for secure land tenure to support customary, local institutions. The
literature is ﬁlled with examples of community management
institutions successfully managing land, especially when receiving
formal recognition from the state (e.g., Bray et al., 2006; Ojha et al.,
2009). Many of the most cited examples provide rich descriptive
inference about the design and operation of community-level
institutions, but do not necessarily contain explicit counterfactuals
that allow for estimates of the impact of land tenure programs. By
comparing titled plots with similar plots that do not have land title
or forest management plans, we have contributed to a growing
body of literature that considers land tenure and community
management institutions based on comparative methods (see
Agrawal, 2001). Since we do not ﬁnd that land titling and forest
management planning reduce forest loss as compared to similar
plots outside intervention areas, our results suggest that scholars
should base claims on explicit comparisons of areas and
communities that differ on tenure status.
Third, development organizations are spending tens of millions
of dollars each year on land titling programs to achieve
conservation goals. Our results suggest this spending may be
insufﬁcient or perhaps even misguided if reducing the rate of forest
loss is a primary goal of the program itself. These programs should
carefully consider the effects of exclusion on colonization, time
horizons, investment opportunities, and access to incentive
schemes. The presence of de facto land tenure institutions has
been reported in some areas of our study region, which may have
promoted successful exclusion apart from formal land tenure
through land title (Rudel, 1995). However, promoting ‘‘land
security’’ in light of pressures from competing users was stated
goal in PSUR documents (CARE, 2007).
As the global community scales up its support of land titling and
land tenure interventions to achieve environmental and develop-
ment goals, land titling programs need to be carefully considered
for their connections to other processes and incentives. With
opportunities for investment in agriculture expanding in many
frontier areas, for example, land titling programs may actually
accelerate changes in land use (Gray et al., 2008). Future research
that connects land titling programs and formal incentive schemes
for maintaining forest cover offers a promising direction. In
particular, geospatial impact evaluations like ours combined with
behavioral experiments and ﬁeld surveys might be used to link
incentives, institutions, and land use decisions to outcomes such as
deforestation.
Fourth, we can only speak to effects that are realized in the
years immediately after the PSUR intervention. Given that other
parts of southeastern Ecuador have experienced deforestation as a
result of colonization and less so extractive industry activity, it
may be the case that the PSUR program will reduce deforestation as
these processes approach the intervention areas. In a political
climate where program impacts need to be immediate and large,
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nounced. We must be careful to reinforce that just because beneﬁts
on forest cover have not been realized to this point, we take no
position on whether they will be realized over a longer period of
time. We intend to follow this program over time, overcoming the
challenge of measuring the long-term effects of policy interven-
tions. Using remotely sensed data, we introduce the possibility of
following the time path of policy effects with limited ﬁeld presence
and little additional cost. We expect that the use of remotely
sensed data can have broad applicability to measuring the long-
term impacts of agriculture, industrial development, aquaculture,
and forestry policies. Thus, we advocate greater incorporation of
these tools into the work of program evaluation.
Finally, we must recognize that our results speak only to the
effects of land titling and forest planning on forest cover. It may be
the case (or not) that the PSUR program had a large and positive
effect on local livelihoods and income or on the ecological
properties of forests that are not measurable by a categorical
land conversion or degradation measured by leaf greenness. Our
analysis cannot and does not intend to speak to these questions.
Likewise, it is possible that land tenure programs will succeed in
reducing forest loss in settings unlike those that we consider as
part of this study, though we do believe our study offers a close to
best case scenario. We cannot rule out this possibility until more
evidence that takes selection effects seriously accumulates.
Many of the implementing partners that reviewed the results of
this study emphasize that PSUR increased local and national
capabilities related to land management. We recognize that these
effects are more difﬁcult to quantify. For example, local paralegals
trained as part of PSUR continued their work in other areas and
projects. Ecuadorian NGOs gained capacity to ﬁll legal loopholes
and advocate for the correction of ambiguous legislation. The sense
among implementing organizations is that PSUR generated clarity
in land rights generally, with spillover effects to subsequent
programs. These claims, while intuitive and deeply held in the
development community in Ecuador, would require very different
study than we present here.
We offer an empirical analysis of a land titling program that
explicitly addresses targeting, modeling assumptions, and collin-
earity between the intervention and other background character-
istics due to spatial clustering. A recent review of the land tenure
literature suggests that research progress will be based on the
accumulation of results from research that takes these challenges
seriously (Robinson et al., 2014). In providing a step in this
direction, we hope to persuade the conservation and development
community to improve the evaluation of land tenure interventions
and consider the promise of these interventions to be testable
hypotheses.
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